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The Magnitude of Warfare Revisited – System Polarity and War
Duration
Abstract
One of the intractable debates in the study of international conflict is the linkage between
polarity and magnitude of interstate warfare. Speculations about the effects of the
structure of the international system can be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia. This
article revisits this debate with a focus on war duration, which has received little attention
in the literature, and presents the first theoretical discussion of the connection between
polarity and war duration. It also uses a hazards model to statistically test whether five
different measures of polarity are associated with war duration (1816-1992). The results
provide initial support for the hypothesis that an increase in the number of poles in the
state system is associated with longer wars on average. The empirical analysis and the
theoretical discussion are important for understanding the consequences of the declining
U.S. hegemony.
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Introduction
One of the intractable debates in the study of international conflict is
the linkage between polarity and the magnitude of warfare. Bueno de
Mesquita and Lalman traced speculation about the effects of the
structure of the international system back to the Treaty of Westphalia.1
This article revisits this debate with new theoretical arguments, testing
this linkage using new empirical methods. The concept of magnitude
consists of several components, such as the number of wars, the
number of states involved, and war duration, all of which are
potentially associated with polarity. This article uses a hazards model
to test whether five different measures of polarity are associated with
war duration, an important measure of the peacefulness of the
international state system. Rather than analyzing the risk and
prevalence of war, which have received attention in several studies, the
focus is on the risk of wars becoming protracted, which has not been
explored thoroughly in the literature. The results provide initial
support for the hypothesis that an increased number of poles in the
state system is associated with longer wars on average.
This article also presents the first theoretical discussion of the
relationship between polarity and war duration. The argument is based
on a two-stage process derived from the realist and rational-choice
perspectives. The first stage determines what types of wars are likely to
emerge given different forms of systemic polarity, while the second
stage determines how fast a bargaining space potentially emerges to
resolve these conflicts. The empirical analysis and the theoretical
discussion are important for understanding the consequences of the
declining U.S. hegemony.
The role of power relations has been central to political realists’
understanding of international politics. Indeed, some scholars argue
that the distribution of power in the anarchical system is “the most
powerful explanation for patterns of a variety of global outcomes.”2
Based on the idea that it is possible to measure concentration of power,
for example, by counting the number of particularly powerful states or
coalitions of states, scholars have identified at least three ideal types of
polarity: Unipolarity (only one dominant state), bipolarity (two
dominant states), and multipolarity (three or more dominant states).3
The influence of polarity on outcomes, however, has been a moot point
among political realists. Based on the views of classical balance-of25
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power theorists such as Carr and Morgenthau, Kaplan stated that
multipolar systems are less war prone.4 Deutsch and Singer also argued
that multipolarity decreases the risk of war, whereas Waltz, observing
the relative stability of great power relations during the cold war,
instead favored bipolarity.5 In addition, Mearsheimer, Levy, and Kegley
and Raymond claimed that multipolarity increases the risk of war.6
Waltz considered bipolarity less war prone, assuming that multiple
poles or stimuli can confuse states and create uncertainty.7 In
bipolarity, there is less uncertainty about the consequences of one’s
actions and a smaller risk of miscalculating the intent and aggressive
capabilities of other states.8 In contrast, Deutsch and Singer argued
that arms races are less likely to escalate to war in multipolarity
because states must divide their attention between several competing
states.9 They therefore expected uncertainty to have the opposite effect
and create cautious behavior. Moreover, crosscutting cleavages and
alliances create diversity in interstate relations, whereas bipolarity
increases the risk of war as conflicts can escalate to involve all states on
both sides.
Empirical evaluation of these classical positions has taken several
forms and achieved mixed results. Haas argued that bipolarity brings
fewer wars, and Hopf also argued that bipolar systems are marginally
less warlike.10 In contrast, Thomson argued that unipolarity is
associated with increased stability whereas multipolarity is the most
war prone system.11 Ostrom and Aldrich found a curvilinear
relationship, in which bipolarity is the most unstable system.12
However, Bueno de Mesquita, focusing on the tightness of alliance
commitments, and Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman argued that neither
the number of poles nor the level of uncertainty is associated with the
risk of war, because most decision makers are risk neutral.13 Levy also
found no connection between the number of poles and the frequency of
war.14 Moreover, Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi found that polarity had no
effect on the likelihood of dispute initiation or of states’ escalating
militarized disputes.15
Some scholars use nation-months of war as the dependent variable.
Whereas Levy found no connection between this measure and polarity,
Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey argued that in the 20th century, high
power concentration was associated with fewer nation-months of war,
though the association was reversed for the 19th century.16 Wayman
used nation-months to analyze the impact of the concentration of
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capabilities, arguing that power multipolarity is associated with more
nation-months of war than is power bipolarity in both the 19th and 20th
centuries.17
Focusing on nation-months of war during a given period is a useful way
to measure the magnitude of warfare in the state system, as it yields
different kind of information than does merely assessing the number of
wars. Indeed, the prevalence of wars is not the only variable that affects
the magnitude of warfare. The magnitude concept consists of three
components, namely, number of wars, number of states involved, and
war duration, all of which influence how many nation-months of war
the state system experiences during any given period.
Because the magnitude of warfare can affect the level of systemic
stability and the associated risk of change, understanding the
magnitude of warfare and its three components in the state system is
an important task in the study of international politics. Waltz defined
systemic stability in terms of both the length of time during which the
number of great powers remains intact and the risk of war among great
powers.18 Levy also pointed out that the concept can mean both “the
maintenance of the status quo and the relative absence of war in the
system.”19 According to the former option, the level of systemic stability
is the probability of variation in the relative standing and number of
great powers. Clearly, protracted fighting among many states, such as
during the world wars, increases the risk of such systemic change,
whereas short and limited wars are more likely to leave the system
intact. War duration therefore not only affects the magnitude of
warfare in the state system (the level of peacefulness) by increasing the
nation-months of warfare, but also possibly affects the risk of systemic
change, both of which make the analytical task important.
Despite its possible implications for the stability of the state system, in
terms of both the magnitude of warfare and systemic change, the
connection between polarity and war duration has received little
attention apart from initial studies by Haas and Levy.20 Both Haas and
Levy argued that multipolarity brings the shortest wars. However, their
statistical tests lacked control variables and Levy merely measured the
number of years of war beginning in the average one-year period. To
address this knowledge gap, this article tests the impact of five different
measures of polarity on the length of wars by conducting a duration
analysis that includes several control variables.

27
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Theory
Why can polarity be associated with war duration? While Haas and
Levy argued, based on their empirical results, that multipolarity is
associated with the shortest wars, they did not theoretically discuss
why they expected to see this connection.21 Accordingly, this article
presents the first theoretical discussion of the connection between
polarity and war duration. Contrary to Haas and Levy, it argues that
multipolarity is more likely to be associated with increasing war
duration. The argument is based on a two-stage process derived from
the realist and rational-choice perspectives. The first stage determines
what types of wars are likely to emerge given different forms of
systemic polarity, while the second stage determines how fast a
bargaining space potentially emerges to resolve these conflicts.
In the first stage, systemic polarity has an impact on what types of wars
are likely to erupt. As Monteiro pointed out, unipolarity often produces
conflict “between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers.”22 Such a
selection bias is likely to create an imbalance in the belligerents’
military capabilities, which makes it easy for the unipole to defeat the
minor power. Examples of such asymmetric confrontations that give
rise to short wars include the Kuwait War of 1991 and the Iraq War of
2003. This selection bias is unlikely to be as great in bipolarity because
of the strict alliance structures or spheres of interest that the two poles’
conflicting interests can create. For example, an attack on Iraq and the
Kuwait War became possible only after the weakening of the Soviet
Union led to a foreign policy change in Moscow and ultimately to the
end of the Cold War.
However, with more poles, external balancing by means of alliances
becomes more flexible as the number of available alliance partners
increases. As Snyder argued, “in a multipolar system, who allies with
whom is structurally indeterminate…each state is logically eligible to be
either friend or enemy of any other state.”23 Indeed, if unipolarity
increasingly brings asymmetric conflicts, the role of a balancer
becomes more prominent in multipolarity, which creates symmetric
wars. Especially after the Napoleonic wars, and even earlier, Great
Britain played the role of a balancer within the European multipolar
system and could throw its support behind one side at one time, and
behind another side at another time.24 Such balancing in multipolarity
increases war duration by creating symmetric conflicts in which the
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warring parties are more equal in power and find it difficult to quickly
defeat each other.
While asymmetric conflicts can end without long negotiations, as the
stronger side can quickly override the weaker side, symmetric conflicts
more often involve the process of creating a bargaining space, that is,
finding a mutually acceptable negotiated solution. Polarity can affect
the duration of this process, as the amount of information that the
systemic structure provides about the expected outcome of a war
varies. Mearsheimer argued that the international state system “is
peaceful when it is obvious that the costs and risk of going to war are
high, and the benefits of going to war are low” and that the distribution
of power between states “is at the heart of this incentive structure.”25
Fearon further developed this rational-choice perspective, claiming
that as fighting is costly and risky, “rational states should have
incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the
gamble of war.”26 His answer to this puzzle of why rational states start
wars relies on the widespread uncertainty in anarchy: Rational state
leaders start wars when they miscalculate due to both a lack of
information and disagreement about relative power.
The same logic also applies to the puzzle of why belligerent states
cannot quickly reach a negotiated settlement when a war has already
started. According to Huth, Gelpi and Bennett, the structure of the
international state system creates an uncertainty that is at the core of
the realist perspective: “As the number of actors in the system
increases, it becomes more difficult to predict the outcome of an armed
conflict since state leaders must correctly predict the behavior of many
independent actors.”27 Uncertainty can also vary during ongoing wars,
depending on the structure of the international system. Uncertainty
becomes increasingly great in multipolarity, in which there are several
major powers whose possible interference complicates states’ ability to
calculate outcomes in ongoing wars. Ideally, battlefield events should
quickly reveal the belligerents’ relative power, with defeats lowering the
expected utility of continued warfare and victories increasing it. As the
weaker side rationally lowers its war aims, a bargaining space should
quickly emerge.28 However, an increase in the number of poles can
complicate this process and affect how belligerents predict future
battlefield outcomes. Either the current actions of several belligerents
or the anticipated interventions by external actors, in the form of future
balancing or bandwagoning, make it increasingly difficult to calculate
the expected outcome and utility of continued warfare. Such
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uncertainty makes wars longer as it is possible for both sides to believe
in victory and have high war aims, hampering the prospects of quickly
creating a bargaining space.
The self-selection of risk-acceptant decision makers when conflict
escalates to wars increases the impact of such uncertainty in
multipolarity further. Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett argued that how
uncertainty affects state behavior depends on the risk propensity of
leaders when deciding whether to escalate to war. However, wartime
leaders are more often risk-acceptant, as those who choose to escalate
to war are less likely to be risk-averse.29 The greater systemic
uncertainty in multipolarity is therefore potentially associated with
decisions to continue warfare rather than with cautiousness.
The length of the second stage, which involves creating a bargaining
space, also depends on the willingness of external actors to mediate
and on the efficacy of such mediation. In unipolarity and bipolarity, the
great powers are likely to be status quo powers that have an interest in
preventing the escalation of ongoing conflicts into world wars. In a
classical statement of neorealism, Grieco wrote that, assuming rational
behavior by states, realism finds that “states in anarchy must be in a
greater or lesser measure…‘defensive positionalists’” concerned about
relative gains.30 However, defensive positionalism does not only
manifest itself in relative gains concerns that make cooperation among
states difficult. States can also lose relative power through extensive
military confrontations that often have uncertain outcomes. The major
powers that are content with the status quo therefore have an interest
in preventing wars from escalating to a protracted world war that can
lead to systemic change. The more power one has, the stronger the
tendency, and it being strongest for a unipole that has reached a
hegemonic position. Even though the two poles in bipolarity find
themselves in competition, they are likely to be more wary of losing
their position than they are in multipolarity. In multipolarity, the
system lacks dominant actors that have the same will to enforce the
status quo and use their influence to bring wars between other states to
a quicker end.
According to Wohlforth, “as the system leader, the United States has
the means and the motive to maintain key security institutions in order
to ease local security conflicts and limit expensive competition among
the other major powers.”31 Indeed, the status quo great powers not only
have an interest in mediating but also the ability to do so in ongoing
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conflicts. Gelpi argued that the greater the military power of the
mediator, the more likely the mediation will be successful.32 This favors
not only a unipole but also the two great powers in bipolarity. In
unipolarity, and to some extent also in bipolarity, the poles can
therefore control their clients and act as stabilizers that mediate
ongoing conflicts. This applies even to proxy wars, as poles can prevent
them from spreading to other states, becoming protracted, and
jeopardizing the international order. In line with this, the United States
was described often as the global policeman, with reference to its
strategy throughout the 1990s.33
On balance, considering the impact of polarity on both the kinds of
wars likely to erupt and how quickly states are likely to resolve these
conflicts, multipolarity is potentially associated with the longest wars.
Contrary to Haas’ and Levy’s findings, multipolarity is likely to lead to
longer wars than does bipolarity, whereas unipolarity brings the
shortest wars.34 This leads to the following testable hypothesis: An
increase in the number of poles in the state system leads to longer
interstate wars on average.

Data analysis
Scholars disagree not only about the effects of polarity; perhaps even
more fundamentally, they also disagree as to what factors they should
consider when defining and measuring polarity. For example, Waltz
argued that the ranking of states can depend on the size of population
and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military
strength, political stability, and competence.35 However, as Grieco
pointed out, some of these components are difficult to define and
measure.36 Therefore, this article uses five different measures of
polarity suggested by Modelski, Levy, Kegley and Raymond,
Mearsheimer, and Monteiro.37
Mearsheimer, Levy, Monteiro, and Kegley and Raymond based their
periodization of polarity in the international system on their study of
history. Mearsheimer proposed three categories of polarity:
Unbalanced multipolarity (multipolarity with a potential hegemon),
balanced multipolarity (multipolarity without a potential hegemon),
and bipolarity. Levy and Monteiro also arrived at three variants:
Multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity. Levy’s data end in 1985, but
it is possible to expand the data by assuming that bipolarity extended at
least until 1989. Monteiro agreed with Levy’s classification but added
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the post-1989 era as one of unipolarity. While his measure is more
precise, differentiating between two forms of multipolarity,
Mearsheimer also noted that Levy’s periodization is widely accepted:
“It is generally agreed that the state system was multipolar from its
inception in 1648 until the Second World War ended in 1945. It was
only bipolar during the Cold War, which began right after the Second
World War and ran until 1989.”38 Kegley and Raymond focused on
multipolarity, so they define all other forms as non-multipolarity. This
smaller number of categories reduces the amount of information but it
is still possible to use them in empirically testing the hypothesis.
Modelski instead used four categories to measure capability
distribution in the state system: Dispersed/pluralistic, multipolarity,
bipolarity, and unipolarity. He also resorted to more objective criteria
in determining the periodization of history. The system is unipolar if
one state has at least 50 percent of the available military power and
bipolar if two states together hold more than 50 percent of the power
(each holding at least 25 percent). It is multipolar if three or more
states together have at least 50 percent and each hold 5–25 percent of
the power, and otherwise it is dispersed/pluralistic. While Modelski
published his work in 1974, Zhang calculated these values between
1885 and 1992, which this article uses for testing the impact of
Modelski’s measure of polarity on the length of wars.39 The different
classifications of the international system are in Appendix 1.
This article uses hazard analysis to evaluate the effect of polarity on war
duration. The literature has also referred to hazard analysis as survival,
transition, duration, failure time, or reliability analysis. Many social
science research questions have an interest in the duration of events,
leading to the consideration of hazards models. For example, if
something such as a war persists, what variables are associated with the
risk of its subsequently ending? The strength of hazards models for the
analysis of war duration is that they can analyze variables that assume
different values over the span of the observed period.40
The most complete work on war duration thus far is that of Bennett
and Stam.41 To perform an adequate test of polarity’s potential impact
on how long wars last, the best approach is to use Bennett and Stam’s
variables as statistical controls. The article uses the same hazard
analysis technique with time-varying covariates, as the available data
include variables with annually measured values. It also applies the
same Weibull specification, which parameterizes the hazard rate as not
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constant and allows for both positive and negative duration
dependence, and fits the model in the accelerated failure time metric.
The available data include the same interstate wars that started
between 1816 and 1992 as in the updated model of Bennett and Stam.42
War duration is measured in months. The data generally follow Small
and Singer’s procedures, which identify the starting and ending dates
of wars by a combination of when actual continuous fighting began and
ended and information about declarations of war and signed
armistices. If there is a considerable difference between actual fighting
and the legal dates of declarations and treaties, priority is given to
when actual fighting occurred.43 The included wars and their lengths
are in Appendix 2.
In the statistical analysis, Mearsheimer’s unbalanced multipolarity is
coded as 1, balanced multipolarity as 2, and bipolarity as 3. The
number of poles is the same in balanced and unbalanced multipolarity.
However, Mearsheimer argued that states are more prone to buckpassing in the case of conflict in balanced multipolarity.44 Buck-passing
hampers the creation of a balance of power and increases the risk of
asymmetric wars, which are likely to be shorter than in unbalanced
multipolarity. Kegley and Raymond’s multipolar periods are coded as 1
and non-multipolar periods as 2. Levy’s measure of polarity is coded as
follows: Multipolarity 1 and bipolarity 2 (there are no instances of
unipolarity). For both Monteiro’s and Modelski’s models, multipolarity
is coded as 1, bipolarity as 2, and unipolarity as 3 (there are no
instances of dispersed/pluralistic capability distribution in Modelski’s
data).
Control variables and their hypothesized effects on war duration,
presented in Table 1, come from Bennett and Stam.45 They include four
dummy variables codifying combinations of the observed strategies of
both the attacker (offensive) and the defender (defensive). There are
three possible strategies: Maneuver, for instances of Blitzkrieg;
attrition, if states fight meeting engagements against each other; and
punishment, if civilians are the principal target and the belligerents use
guerilla warfare. Terrain is a dummy variable, where 0 stands for open
terrain and 1 for impassable terrain. To measure the interaction of
terrain and strategy, Bennett and Stam multiplied a single ordinalscaled strategy variable by terrain. Balance of forces is the ratio of the
largest side’s total capability to all the belligerents’ total capability.
Correlates of war (COW) capability scores are discounted according to
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the distance from a state to the battlefield. Total military capabilities
use COW national capability measures of both sides’ total military
personnel in millions. Total population measures the states’ total
populations as indicated in the same dataset. Bennett and Stam also
calculated the population ratio of the larger side to that of the smaller
side.
Table 1. Control Variables
Name

Explanation

Strategy: OADM

Offensive attrition, defensive maneuver.

Strategy: OADA
Strategy: OADP
Strategy: OPDA
Terrain
Terrain X Strategy
Balance of forces
Military personnel
(millions)
Population (billions)
Population ratio

Offensive attrition, defensive attrition.
Offensive attrition, defensive punishment.
Offensive punishment, defensive attrition.
Open terrain shortens war duration.
Strategy fitting the terrain shortens war duration.
Imbalance of forces shortens war duration.
The more forces involved, the longer the war.

Quality ratio
Surprise
Salience
Repression
Democracy
Previous disputes
Number of states

The greater the total populations, the longer the war.
Disparity in the belligerents’ population sizes shortens
war duration.
Difference in the belligerents’ military quality shortens
war duration.
Strategic surprise shortens war duration.
Low issue salience shortens war duration.
Repressive states fight risky wars that are short.
Increased total level of democracy among the
belligerents shortens the war.
Previous disputes prolong the war.
A high number of belligerents shortens war duration.

Source: Author, based on information in Bennet and Stam (2006).

Bennet and Stam estimated the difference in the quality of the military
forces by dividing a state’s military expenditure by the number of
military personnel and then creating a ratio of the superior side’s
quality to that of the inferior side. Surprise is a measure of strategic
surprise at any time during the war; it ranges from 0 (no or
symmetrical surprise) to 1 (large and asymmetrical surprise). Issue
salience is coded as 0 (salient to neither side), 1 (salient to one side), or
2 (salient to both sides) using Holsti’s categorization.46 Bennet and
Stam obtained a measure of the repressiveness of the governments by
summing the repressiveness measures of each side using the Polity II
dataset’s competitiveness of participation variable. It ranges from –5
(significant and regular political competition) to –1 (no significant
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opposition activity permitted). They also constructed a democracy
variable by summing the democracy value of each side using the Polity
II dataset’s institutionalized democracy variable, which ranges from 0
(high level of democracy) to 10 (low level of democracy).
Bennet and Stam measured previous disputes using the COW
militarized interstate dispute (MID) dataset by counting the average
number of disputes lasting at least thirty days in the ten years before
each war between all pairs of states on the opposing sides. They then
divided the total number of disputes by the number of states in each
war. The number of states indicates how many states were involved in
the war based on the COW interstate war dataset.
There is no single best measure of fit in hazards models. Still, in
accordance with Bennett and Stam, this article estimates a proportional
reduction in error as a proportion of actual war duration (PRE%) as a
measure of how well the different models fit the data.47 This provides
an intuitively appealing measure of model fit. The article calculates
PRE% by first estimating a constant-only model and summing the
absolute prediction error across all wars. It then estimates the complete
models with control variables and different measures of polarity and
sums the absolute prediction errors across all wars. The proportional
reduction in error (PRE) is obtained by subtracting a complete model’s
prediction error from the constant-only model’s prediction error and
dividing the result by the constant-only model’s prediction error.
Finally, PRE% is arrived at by dividing the sum of prediction error by
the actual war duration.
Comparing the full models in Table 2, including the five measures of
systemic polarity, with Bennett and Stam’s analysis reveals no
substantial differences.48 One control variable, strategy multiplied by
terrain, is no longer statistically significant. However, the main result
of the analysis in Table 2 partially corroborates the hypothesis,
indicating that there is a statistically significant association between
Mearsheimer’s, Levy’s, and Monteiro’s measures of polarity and war
duration.49 That multipolarity brings about the longest wars
contradicts not only Haas’s but also Levy’s findings that were based on
the same classification of polarity in the international state system as
used in this analysis.50
Positive coefficients indicate longer war durations and negative
coefficients shorter war durations. Exponentiating Mearsheimer’s
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coefficient, –0.804, results in a hazard ratio of 2.104, which means that
the hazard of war termination increases by 110 percent when moving
from unbalanced multipolarity to balanced multipolarity or from
balanced multipolarity to bipolarity. Levy’s and Monteiro’s coefficients,
–1.058 and –0.954, yield hazard ratios of 2.850 and 2.440,
respectively, which means that the hazard of war termination increases
by 185 or 144 percent when moving from multipolarity to bipolarity or
from bipolarity to unipolarity, respectively. These three models
therefore indicate that an increase in the number of poles in the state
system leads to longer wars on average. Wars waged during bipolarity
are shorter than those waged during multipolarity, and wars are the
shortest when the system is unipolar.
Modelski’s measure of polarity was not statistically significant, even
though the coefficient points in the same direction. A possible reason
for this is that Modelski considered all the participants in the state
system. However, polarity is arguably “a function of the distribution of
power only among major powers.”51 In that case, Modelski’s seemingly
objective measure of polarity may include too much information, as
compared with Mearsheimer’s, Levy’s, Monteiro’s, and Kegley and
Raymond’s analyses of history. Kegley and Raymond’s measure of
polarity was not statistically significant, even though their coefficient
also points in the same direction.
Looking at the PRE%, rather than merely at PRE, the three models with
statistically significant measures of polarity also seem to fit the data
best and are clear improvements on Bennett and Stam’s analysis of war
duration.52 The reduction of prediction error relative to the constantonly model, as a proportion of actual war duration, is 63 percent in
Mearsheimer’s model, 74 percent in Levy’s, and 70 percent in
Monteiro’s, as compared with 45 percent in Bennett and Stam’s
original model. Therefore, adding these measures of systemic polarity
to the original model improves its explanatory power.
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Table 2. Hazard Analysis: The Effect of Systemic Polarity on War
Duration
Variable

Mearsheimer

Levy

Kegley and
Raymond

Strateg. OADM
Strateg. OADA
Strateg. OADP
Strateg. OPDA
Terrain
Terrain X strategy
Balance of forces

2.703 (0.608)***
2.763 (0.550)***
4.504 (1.213)***
9.429 (2.183)***
0.439 (3.173)
-0.790 (0.732)
-4.864 (1.205)***

2.181 (0.537)***
2.308 (0.545)***
4.549 (1.129)***
8.226 (2.052)***
1.765 (2.700)
-0.883 (0.685)
-4.672 (1.227)***

Military personnel
Total population
Population ratio
Quality ratio
Surprise
Salience
Repression
Democracy
Previous disputes
Number of states
Polarity

0.108 (0.039)***
1.534 (0.588)***
0.015 (0.011)
0.004 (0.005)
0.207 (0.593)
0.500 (0.224)**
-0.250 (0.116)**
-0.119 (0.053)**
0.003 (0.054)
-0.249 (0.102)**
-0.804
(0.261)***
4.409 (1.571)
-124.6
0.925
0.079
-4.2
23.4
12.1
20.4
-0.1
3.7

2.453 (0.541)***
2.628 (0.531)***
4.647 (1.211)***
9.702 (2.012)***
1.727 (2.917)
-1.008 (0.683)
-5.256
(1.274)***
0.105 (0.041)**
1.531 (0.687)**
0.018 (0.012)
0.005 (0.006)
0.438 (0.597)
0.533 (0.207)**
-0.206 (0.118)*
-0.099 (0.054)*
-0.020 (0.048)
-0.207 (0.102)**
-1.058 (0.471)**
4.347 (1.622)
-122.4
0.988
0.080
-2.6
23.5
11.5
20.6
-0.1
3.9

3.384 (1.477)
-132.1
0.929
0.081
-4.0
18.3
10.4
15.6
-0.4
3.9

0.174
0.736
79
170

0.236
0.548
80
171

Constant
Log-likelihood
p (duration param.)
SD of p
Mean error (months)
SD of mean error
Mean absolute error
SD of absolute error
Median error
Median absolute
error
PRE
PRE%
Number of wars
Data points

0.121
0.632
79
170

1.147 (0.044)***
0.956 (0.583)
0.012 (0.012)
0.006 (0.006)
0.075 (0.610)
0.443 (0.202)**
-0.218 (0.118)*
-0.094 (0.057)
-0.012 (0.054)
-0.226 (0.096)**
-0.381 (0.375)

Source: Author.
Notes: Coefficients reported and standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests
one-tailed in accordance with Bennett and Stam (2006). Calculations made with
STATA 11.2.
*p < .10
**p < .05
***p < .01
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Table 2. Continued
Variable

Modelski

Monteiro

Bennett and Stam
(2006)

Strateg. OADM
Strateg. OADA
Strateg. OADP
Strateg. OPDA
Terrain
Terrain X strategy
Balance of forces

1.515 (0.819)*
1.634 (0.840)*
4.229 (2.141)**
5.757 (3.548)
-0.351 (3.965)
-0.068 (1.098)
-6.237
(1.843)***
0.122
(0.045)***
1.346 (0.726)*
0.021 (0.025)
-0.028 (0.017)
0.498 (0.649)
0.207 (0.415)
-0.247 (0.234)

1.600 (0.666)**
1.492 (0.790)*
2.528 (1.519)*
5.518 (2.621)**
-2.756 (3.737)
0.127 (0.883)
-4.582
(1.246)***
0.110
(0.042)***
1.653 (0.830)**
0.017 (0.013)
0.004 (0.006)
0.418 (0.660)
0.492 (0.205)**
-0.237
(0.120)**
-0.108 (0.057)*
-0.020 (0.053)
-0.221 (0.102)**

2.287 (0.539)***
2.489 (0.489)***
4.857 (1.084)***
8.495 (2.063)***
2.323 (2.571)
-1.002 (0.669)*
-4.470 (1.226)***

Military personnel
Total population
Population ratio
Quality ratio
Surprise
Salience
Repression
Democracy
Previous disputes
Number of states
Polarity
Constant
Log-likelihood
p (duration param.)
SD of p
Mean error
(months)
SD of mean error
Mean absolute error
SD of absolute error
Median error
Median absolute
error
PRE
PRE%
Number of wars
Data points
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-0.093 (0.108)
-0.079 (0.072)
-0.221
(0.095)**
-0.118 (0.705)
4.890 (2.446)
-102.1
0.888
0.095
-3.9

0.123 (0.039)***
0.825 (0.552)*
0.008 (0.012)
0.007 (0.006)
-0.176 (0.559)
0.387 (0.207)**
-0.223 (0.113)**
-0.104 (0.055)**
-0.006 (0.057)
-0.193 (0.092)**

-0.954 (0.525)*
4.793 (1.817)
-130.0
0.936
0.077
-3.4

2.641 (1.233)
-132.5
0.923
0.083
-4.2

20.6
11.2
17.6
-0.1
3.4

21.0
10.8
18.3
-0.2
3.6

18.0
10.5
15.2
-0.5
4.5

0.372
0.605
61
127

0.205
0.703
80
171

0.228
0.453
80
171
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Conclusion
The empirical results about the effect of polarity on the frequency of
wars remain unclear.53 The present results, however, provide initial
support for the hypothesis that an increase in the number of poles in
the state system is associated with longer wars. Especially
Mearsheimer’s, Levy’s, and Monteiro’s measures of polarity indicate
that wars waged during multipolarity are the longest. The results of the
duration analysis with several control variables therefore contradict
Haas’ and Levy’s claim that multipolarity brings the shortest wars.54
Moreover, by focusing on war duration rather than war frequency, the
results support a reformulation of Waltz’s classical argument that
multipolarity is the most unstable state system.55 If an increase in the
number of poles is associated with greater war duration, even systemic
stability defined as the peacefulness of a system can decrease, as the
system experiences more nation-months of warfare with longer wars.
The stability or peacefulness of the state system (magnitude of warfare)
is measured by both how many wars erupt and by how quickly they
end.
The results are also interesting because war duration can potentially
affect systemic stability defined in terms of the risk of systemic change.
As long conflicts such as world wars increase the risk of systemic
change, the longevity of the status quo should be affected negatively by
multipolarity. However, it is not clear that multipolar periods in the
state system are the shortest ones, as bipolarity and unipolarity also
have their own sources of instability that limit their prospects of
enduring for long. The Soviet fall from superpower status showed that
the cost of maintaining such a position can be high, and the current
rising power of China is indicative of uneven economic development in
the state system. Indeed, Gilpin pointed out the high costs of sustaining
preeminence and loss of comparative edge as the causes of hegemonic
decline.56 Wohlforth argued that the United States-led unipolar
moment might last quite long.57 Waltz, however, held that dominant
powers tend to take on too many tasks and that balancing tendencies
by other states are already taking place as “unbalanced power, whoever
wields it, is a potential danger to others.”58 It is clear that U.S.
hegemony has been eroding with the rising economic power of China,
increasing military expenditures of both China and Russia, and
Russia’s more active role in, for example, Syria. However, it is still
unclear when the unipolar moment will end, if it has not already ended,
and what kind of polarity will emerge in the future.
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The results of this study suggest that a retreat to multipolarity with
several great powers would increase the risk of dire consequences in
terms of increased average war duration. Longer wars often not only
cause more human suffering but also create a greater economic burden
for the belligerents, decreasing the expected benefits of warfare. Longer
wars are also associated with a greater risk that the initiator will lose.59
Warfare is a possible foreign policy option in the realist tradition.
However, classical realism directly prescribes, and structural realism
assumes, rational decision making in response to the problems of
anarchy. If the international state system is headed for multipolarity,
rational decision making in response to the challenges of the
international state system should strive to recognize the diminished
expected utility of starting a war. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman argue
that there is no connection between the frequency of wars or dispute
initiation and polarity.60 In that case, decision makers are probably
more aware of the risks of warfare, as compared with, for example,
Waltz’s claim that warfare is more frequent in multipolarity.61
In sum, the fact that this study had to test several statistical models
suggests that the field is still under-theorized, as scholars have different
views of how to define and operationalize systemic polarity. Dyad-level
variables are also important for understanding states’ conflict behavior
and realists often find it necessary to supplement their theories with
non-structural variables.62 An analysis of how polarity is associated
with war duration demonstrates, however, that political realism’s
traditional focus on the structural correlates of war and stability has
significant explanatory power.
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Appendix 1. Classification of Systemic Polarity, 1816–1992
Scholar

Period

Polarity

Mearsheimer (2001)

1816–1902
1903–1918
1919–1938
1939–1944
1945–1990
1816–1945
1946–1989
1816–1914
1915–1918
1919–1939
1940–1992
1816–1945
1946–1989
1990–1992
1885–1918
1919–1919
1920–1929
1930–1931
1932–1937
1938–1938
1939–1941
1942–1944
1945–1946
1947–1951
1952–1953
1954–1974
1975–1981
1982–1988
1989–1992

Balanced multipolarity
Unbalanced multipolarity
Balanced multipolarity
Balanced multipolarity
Bipolarity
Multipolarity
Bipolarity
Multipolarity
Non-multipolarity
Multipolarity
Non-multipolarity
Multipolarity
Bipolarity
Unipolarity
Multipolarity
Unipolarity
Multipolarity
Unipolarity
Multipolarity
Bipolarity
Multipolarity
Bipolarity
Unipolarity
Bipolarity
Unipolarity
Bipolarity
Multipolarity
Bipolarity
Multipolarity

Levy (1985)
Kegley and Raymond (1994)

Monteiro (2012)

Modelski (1974)

Source: The information in the appendix comes from Mearsheimer (2001), Levy
(1985), Kegley and Raymond (1994), Monteiro (2012), and Modelski (1974).
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Appendix 2. Interstate Wars in Bennett and Stam’s Dataset
War name

Start year

Length in months

Franco–Spanish
Mexican–American
Austro–Sardinian
1st Schleswig–Holstein
Roman Republic
La Plata
Crimean
Anglo–Persian
Italian Unification
Italo–Roman
Italo–Sicilian
Franco–Mexican
2nd Schleswig–Holstein
Lopez
Spanish–Chilean
Seven Weeks
Franco–Prussian
Russo-Turkish
Pacific
Central American
Serbo–Bulgarian
Sino–Japanese
Greco–Turkish
Spanish–American
Boxer Rebellion
Russo–Japanese
Central American
Central American
Italo–Turkish
First Balkan
Second Balkan
World War I
Hungarian–Allies
Greco–Turkish
Russo–Polish
Sino–Soviet
Manchurian
Chaco
Sino–Japanese
Changkufeng
German–Czech
German–Austrian
Nomohan
Russo–Finnish
World War II, German–Polish

1823
1846
1848
1848
1849
1851
1854
1856
1859
1860
1860
1862
1864
1864
1866
1866
1870
1877
1879
1885
1885
1894
1897
1898
1900
1904
1906
1907
1911
1912
1913
1914
1919
1919
1920
1929
1931
1932
1937
1938
1938
1938
1939
1939
1939

4
22
16
6
2
12
28
6
5
10
2
58
6
63
6
1
10
9
58
4
3
9
5
4
15
16
3
11
12
7
2
52
5
41
6
4
19
36
96
1
0.033
0.1
4
4
1
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War name
World War II, German–Belgian
World War II, German–Netherlands
World War II, German–Danish
World War II, German–Norwegian
World War II, German–French
World War II, Italo–Greek
World War II, Pacific
World War II, Western
World War II, Eastern
World War II, German–Yugoslav
World War II, German–Greek
Franco–Thai
1st Kashmir
Palestine
Korean
Russo–Hungarian
Sinai
Sino–Indian
Vietnamese I
Second Kashmir
Six Day
Israeli–Egyptian
Football
Bangladesh
Yom Kippur
Turko–Cypriot
Vietnamese II
Ethiopian–Somalian
Ugandan–Tanzanian
Iran–Iraq
Falklands
Israeli–Syria (Lebanon)
Sino–Vietnamese
Kuwait War
Gulf War

Start year
1940
1940
1940
1940
1940
1940
1941
1942
1941
1941
1941
1940
1947
1948
1950
1956
1956
1962
1964
1965
1967
1970
1969
1971
1973
1974
1975
1977
1978
1980
1982
1982
1985
1990
1991

Length in months
0.11
0.1
0.033
2
1.5
2
45
60
46
0.33
0.67
3
24
8
36
1
1
1
121
5
0.2
0.25
0.15
2
3
1
3
8
6
96
3
2
60
0.1
2.83

Source: The information in the appendix comes from Bennet and Stam’s (2006)
updated dataset.
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